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THESES
•	 Finland	views	Russia	through	the	prism	of	economic	and	political	oppor-
tunities.	 Russia	 is	 an	 important	 outlet	 for	 Finnish	 exports	 and	 a	 source	
of	supplies	of	natural	resources.	Frequent	meetings	of	the	two	countries’	
presidents	and	prime	ministers	are	part	of	 the	 intensive	bilateral	politi-
cal	relations.	From	Helsinki’s	point	of	view,	these	meetings	provide	a	boost	
for	Finland’s	international	profile	as	a	broker	in	the	dialogue	between	the	
West	 and	 Russia.	 Finnish	 decision-makers	 also	 capitalise	 on	 diplomatic	
contacts	with	Russia	in	domestic	policy:	as	an	opportunity	to	demonstrate	
to	the	electorate	their	pragmatic	attitude	in	relations	with	a	country	which	
is	viewed	in	Finland	as	a	great	power.	
•	 On	the	other	hand,	Finland	sees	Russia	as	a	source	of	challenges	to	its	sov-
ereignty.	This	is	why	Finland’s	strategy	towards	Russia	combines	economic	
and	political	co-operation,	intended	at	reducing	the	risk	of	bilateral	tensions,	
with	military	deterrence.	Finland	is	concerned	by	Russia’s	rising	military	and	
the	Russian	vision	of	the	international	order	based	on	great	powers’	spheres	
of	influence	in	which	Finland	has	to	play	the	role	of	a	buffer	zone	between	
Russia	and	NATO.	Proof	that	the	Finnish	armed	forces	are	being	prepared	for	
a	defence	operation	against	Russia	include	maintaining	general	conscription	
with	a	huge	 trained	reserve	 force,	 focusing	on	 territorial	defence,	and	ex-
cluding	Russian	equipment	from	military	procurements.	Regardless	of	this,	
Finland	officially	does	not	define	Russia	as	a	threat.	It	arises	from	Finland’s	
efforts	to	maintain	good	relations	with	Moscow	and	its	non-alignment	that	
gives	Helsinki	no	reason	to	see	political	and	military	benefits	in	highlighting	
the	threat	posed	by	Russia’s	armed	forces.	
•	 Finland	as	a	non-aligned	country	situated	in	the	periphery	of	its	civilisa-
tional	base	(the	West)	and	bordering	on	a	potentially	hostile	power,	is	con-
stantly	demonstrating	its	will	to	defend	its	independence.	It	does	so	mainly	
through	general	conscription	and	by	organising	refresher	training	for	re-
servists.	Focusing	on	maintaining	adequately	trained	reserve	units,	with	
moderate	defence	expenditure,	Finland	wants	to	deter	Russia	above	all	by	
way	of	 its	 armed	 forces’	wartime	 strength	 (currently	being	 increased	 to	
280,000	soldiers).	This	capability	to	mobilise	a	significant	number	of	troops	
raises	the	costs	of	possible	aggression.	
•	 The	Russian-Ukrainian	war	has	breathed	new	life	 into	 the	discussion	on	
the	 weaknesses	 of	 the	 Finnish	 defence	 model.	 Along	 with	 the	 materiel	
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shortages	resulting	from	underfunding	the	total	defence	system,	another	
drawback	of	the	Finnish	army	is	the	time-consuming	mobilisation	process.	
This	concerns	mainly	the	land	forces	which	are	composed	of	reserve	units	
and	in	peacetime	are	focused	on	training	conscripts.	In	the	coming	years,	
Finland	 will	 invest	 in	 improving	 the	 level	 of	 the	 armed	 forces’	 combat	
readiness	 and	will	 allocate	 additional	 funds	 to	 technical	modernisation.	
However,	the	plans	to	increase	the	defence	budget	need	to	be	viewed	with	
caution,	because	welfare	state	expenses	are	given	top	priority	in	Finland.	
What	Finland’s	ministry	of	defence	will	find	as	the	greatest	challenge	will	
be	ensuring	adequate	funding	for	the	ambitious	programmes	of	rearming	
the	navy	and	the	air	force	over	the	next	decade.	
•	 Since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	the	non-aligned	Finland	has	acted	with	cau-
tion	as	regards	enhancing	military	co-operation	with	the	West.	Besides,	it	
has	avoided	developing	military	 capabilities	which	Moscow	might	 inter-
pret	as	offensive.	However,	the	increasing	potential	of	the	Russian	armed	
forces	and	the	military	interventions	 in	Georgia	and	Ukraine	have	made	
Finland	 decide	 to	 intensify	 its	 defence	 co-operation	with	NATO	 and	 the	
USA.	The	gradual	change	of	the	approach	in	this	respect	sparks	increasing	
controversies	in	the	parliament.	The	Finnish	political	centre-right	wants	as	
close	defence	co-operation	with	NATO	and	the	USA	as	possible,	while	the	
centre-left	opts	for	a	balance	between	the	pro-Western	course	of	defence	
policy	and	the	need	to	maintain	good	relations	with	Russia.	
•	 Finland	has	not	applied	for	NATO	membership	but	does	not	rule	this	out	
in	the	future	in	governmental	documents.	By	doing	so,	it	hints	to	Moscow	
that	the	unfavourable	changes	in	the	Russian	policy	towards	Finland	may	
encourage	 it	 to	withdraw	 from	 its	non-aligned	 status.	However,	 there	 is	
a	strong	political	and	social	resistance	 to	NATO	membership	 in	Finland.	
The	tradition	of	making	strategic	decisions	on	the	basis	of	political	consen-
sus	means	that	any	potential	application	for	NATO	membership	would	re-
quire	support	from	all	the	major	political	parties.	
•	 Finland’s	closest	partner	 in	defence	co-operation	 is	non-aligned	Sweden.	
This	country	would	be	able	to	provide	military	aid	to	Finland	fastest	of	all,	
and	the	Swedish	territory	would	secure	strategic	depth	for	the	Finnish	air	
force	and	navy.	However,	bilateral	defence	co-operation	is	still	hindered	by	
a	certain	level	of	mistrust	between	Finland	and	Sweden.	It	is	missing	com-
mon	planning	for	wartime	and	both	parties	are	far	from	establishing	a	for-
mal	bilateral	military	alliance.	Finland	is	watching	the	Swedish	debate	on	
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NATO	membership	closely,	since	a	revision	of	the	Swedish	stance	on	this	
issue	might	have	a	stronger	impact	on	increasing	support	for	NATO	acces-
sion	in	Finland	than	the	threat	posed	by	Russia.	
8O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
5/
20
18
InTroducTIon
The	Russian	annexation	of	Crimea	has	provoked	a	return	to	viewing	security	
in	terms	of	the	readiness	to	defend	one’s	own	territory	in	the	Nordic-Baltic	
region.	This	has	led	to	intensifying	interest	in	the	Finnish	defence	model	based	
on	general	conscription,	a	huge	trained	reserve	force,	and	territorial	defence.	
It	has	also	intensified	the	debate	on	Finland’s	potential	NATO	membership	and	
its	perception	of	Russia.	It	is	thus	worth	having	a	closer	look	at	Finland’s	secu-
rity	policy	and	armed	forces,	taking	into	account	the	special	nature	of	Finnish-	
-Russian	relations.	
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I. AuTonomy, IndEpEndEncE, FInlAndISATIon
Since	Finland	gained	 independence	 in	December	 1917,	 it	has	 treated	Russia	
alternately	as	an	enemy	and	a	friend.	The	anti-Soviet	trend	came	to	the	fore	
between	World	War	I	and	World	War	II.	During	the	Cold	War	period,	Finland-	
-USSR	friendship	was	highlighted	in	the	Finnish	government’s	official	nar-
rative.	Since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	Finland	has	made	efforts	to	maintain	
partnership-based	relations	with	Russia,	having	abandoned	thinking	in	terms	
of	antagonism	or	subordination.	
When	as	a	consequence	of	the	Russian-Swedish	war	in	1809	Russia	annexed	
Sweden’s	Finnish	provinces,	Tsar	Alexander	I	granted	consent	to	the	estab-
lishment	of	 the	Grand	Duchy	of	 Finland.	The	Russian	Empire	 adopted	 this	
conciliatory	policy	in	order	to	guarantee	Finns’	loyalty	because	it	feared	that	
Sweden	might	make	efforts	to	regain	the	lost	Finnish	lands	which	Russia	used	
as	a	protective	buffer	for	Saint	Petersburg.	Positive	connotations	prevail	in	the	
Finnish	memory	of	the	Russian	rule	in	the	19th	century.	It	is	viewed	as	a	factor	
which	facilitated	the	Finnish	state-building	and	nation-building	process	and	
contributed	to	the	modernisation	of	the	country1.	The	Grand	Duchy	of	Finland	
was	bonded	with	Russia	through	personal	union	as	an	autonomous	part	of	the	
Empire	with	its	own	government,	parliament,	currency	and	army2.	The	fact	
that	Finnish	was	granted	the	status	of	the	second	official	language	in	addition	
to	Swedish	played	an	important	role	in	Finns’	national	emancipation.	A	monu-
ment	of	Tsar	Alexander	II	still	stands	in	the	centre	of	Helsinki.	
The	situation	changed	already	during	the	rule	of	Alexander	III,	and	the	restric-
tion	of	Finland’s	autonomy	by	Nicholas	II	took	the	form	of	Russification	(from	
1899)3.	Finland	capitalised	on	the	October	Revolution	to	break	free	from	Russia	
and	announced	independence	on	6	December	1917.	These	events	were	accompa-
nied	by	a	severe	political	crisis.	The	future	of	the	state	was	decided	in	the	civil	
war	(January–May	1918),	when	the	governmental	 ‘White’	troops	(represent-
ing	bourgeois	parties	and	supported	by	Germany)	defeated	the	revolutionary	
1	 M.	Klinge,	Krótka historia Finlandii,	Helsinki	1997,	pp.	64–65.
2	 The	 status	 of	 the	Grand	Duchy	 of	 Finland	was	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	Kingdom	of	 Poland	
in	1815–1832.
3	 This	was	an	effect	of	Russia’s	concern	about	the	destabilising	influence	of	the	liberal	Finnish	
experiment	on	the	situation	inside	the	Empire	and	the	desire	to	tighten	the	grip	on	Finland	
out	of	 fear	 that	 its	 territory	 could	be	used	by	Germany	 in	 case	of	war.	The	Russification	
provoked	tension,	one	manifestation	of	which	was	the	assassination	of	the	Tsar’s	highest	
representative	in	Helsinki,	Nikolai	Bobrikov,	Governor-General	of	Finland,	in	1904.
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‘Red’	forces	(i.e.	Finnish	socialists	backed	by	Soviet	Russia).	In	the	inter-war	
period,	anti-Soviet	and	anti-Russian	rhetoric	in	Finland	was	aimed	at	unifying	
a	Finnish	society	–	that	had	been	strongly	divided	due	to	the	civil	war	–	in	the	
face	of	the	external	enemy4.	This	fitted	in	with	the	narrative	of	Finland’s	role	
as	the	West’s	outpost	against	the	Soviet	threat.	The	Soviet	aggression	on	Finland	
and	the	Winter	War	(1939–1940)	as	well	as	the	Continuation	War	(1941–1944;	
the	Finnish	campaign	against	the	USSR	fought	alongside	the	Nazi	Germany	
with	the	intention	of	regaining	the	lands	lost	in	the	Winter	War	and	to	avoid	
German	occupation)	reinforced	the	image	of	Russia	as	an	enemy5.	As	a	result	
of	World	War	II,	Finland	lost	around	2.5%	of	its	pre-war	population	and	10%	of	its	
territory,	which	entailed	the	need	to	resettle	400,000	refugees.	The	obligation	
to	pay	large	war	reparations	to	the	USSR	was	also	imposed	on	it.	In	World	War	
II	Finland	defended	its	independence	but	it	did	find	itself	in	Moscow’s	sphere	
of	influence	(even	though	Finland	was	not	made	part	of	the	Eastern	Bloc).	It	was	
symbolised	by	the	Finno-Soviet	Treaty	of	19486	and	the	Soviet	military	base	
in	Porkkala	near	Helsinki	(leased	in	1944–1956).	
The	Cold	War	initiated	a	new	era	in	Finnish-Soviet	relations.	The	Finno-Soviet	
Treaty	of	 1948	envisaged	 the	possibility	of	military	consultations	and	 joint	
defence	in	case	of	aggression	from	Germany	or	its	ally,	imposing	the	undertaking	
on	Helsinki	and	Moscow	to	refrain	from	joining	any	alliances	targeted	against	
one	another7.	From	Helsinki’s	point	of	view,	the	most	important	part	was	the	
preamble	which	mentioned	Finland’s	desire	to	remain	outside	the	conflicting	
4	 In	the	inter-war	period,	the	antagonism	was	fuelled	by	the	issue	of	Karelia,	the	land	spread-
ing	on	both	sides	of	the	Finnish-Soviet	border	which	was	believed	to	be	the	cradle	of	Finn-
ish	 culture	and	 the	nation;	 this	belief	 originated	 from	 the	 19th-century	Finnish	national	
epic	poem	Kalevala.	Various	organisations	spreading	ryssänviha,	i.e.	hatred	of	everything	
that	is	Russian,	were	active	in	Finland.	H.	Luostarinen,	Finnish russophobia: the story of an 
enemy image,	“Journal	of	Peace	Research”,	vol.	26,	no.	2,	1989,	pp.	123–137;	B.	Szordykowska,	
Historia Finlandii,	Warszawa	2011,	pp.	246–247;	C.	Browning,	P.	Joenniemi,	Karelia as a Finn-
ish-Russian Issue: Re-negotiating the Relationship between National Identity, Territory and Sov-
ereignty,	University	of	Tartu,	May	2014,	http://ceurus.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/
Browning-and-Joenniemi-2014.pdf
5	 In	September	1944,	Finland	withdrew	from	military	co-operation	with	Nazi	Germany	and	
signed	an	armistice	with	the	USSR	under	which	it	began	the	war	against	Germany	(the	Lap-
land	War).	Owing	 to	 this	 Finnish	 territory	was	not	 occupied,	 and	Finland,	despite	major	
combatant	casualties	(around	95,000),	sustained	minor	losses	among	its	civilian	population.
6	 Its	full	name	is	the	Agreement	of	Friendship,	Co-operation	and	Mutual	Assistance	between	
the	Union	of	Soviet	Socialist	Republics	and	the	Republic	of	Finland.	The	period	between	the	
armistice	with	the	USSR	and	signing	the	Finno-Soviet	Treaty	(1944–1947)	is	known	in	Fin-
land	as	‘the	years	of	danger’	because	of	the	fear	of	a	communist	coup.	
7	 R.	Penttilä,	Finland’s search for security through defence, 1944–1989,	London	1991,	pp.	29–34.
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interests	of	the	great	powers.	This	made	it	possible	for	Finland	to	refer	to	the	
treaty,	declaring	a	policy	of	neutrality	and	seeking	recognition	for	it	in	the	West	
and	in	the	USSR.	Finland’s	neutrality	policy	during	the	Cold	War	was	in	fact	
targeted	at	marginalising	the	military	provisions	of	the	treaty,	even	though	
officially	Helsinki	emphasised	its	significance	in	its	foreign	and	security	policy.	
Finland’s	military	potential	in	the	Cold	War	period	was	officially	developed	
to	repel	NATO’s	attack	against	Soviet	Union	through	Finnish	territory.	The	USSR	
was	an	important	supplier	of	armament	and	military	equipment	to	Finland,	
offering	loans	for	technical	modernisation	of	the	Finnish	armed	forces.	However,	
these	investments	in	the	defence	capabilities	were	actually	aimed	at	improving	
Finland’s	prospects	for	avoiding	‘military	assistance’	in	case	of	a	crisis	between	
the	West	and	the	USSR	(i.e.	the	entry	of	Soviet	forces	onto	Finland’s	territory	
and	the	loss	of	independence)8.	
In	the	Cold	War	period,	Finland’s	policy	towards	the	USSR	was	based	on	the	
assumption	that	the	better	the	bilateral	relations	were,	the	greater	the	trust	
between	Helsinki	and	Moscow	would	be	and	the	more	room	for	manoeuvre	
there	would	be	in	developing	Finland’s	co-operation	with	the	West9.	This	policy	
that	Finland	had	to	adopt	as	a	result	of	the	new	balance	of	power	required	public	
support,	which	was	built	in	a	top-down	manner	by	creating	a	positive	image	
of	the	USSR.	The	means	employed	included	the	activity	of	the	Finnish-Soviet	
Society,	censorship	of	 the	media,	destructions	of	book	collections,	 removal	
of	anti-Soviet	monuments	and	contents	 from	school	 textbooks,	 the	dissolu-
tion	of	anti-Soviet	organisations	and	personnel	changes	at	state	institutions	
(including	the	army	and	the	police)10.	Another	contributory	factor	to	the	change	
of	the	perception	of	the	USSR	was	the	dynamic	development	of	Finnish-Soviet	
trade	which	became	one	of	the	economic	pillars	of	the	welfare	state	in	Finland.	
The	USSR	was	Finland’s	most	 important	trade	partner	–	 in	the	peak	period	
(1980s),	exports	to	the	USSR	accounted	for	25%	of	total	Finnish	exports.	In	1973,	
8	 One	example	of	 strengthening	defence	against	 a	NATO	attack	were	 considerable	 invest-
ments	in	the	air	defence	of	the	Lapland	region	(northern	Finland)	which	was	located	along	
the	line	of	possible	strike	on	the	Soviet	nuclear	arsenal	on	the	Kola	Peninsula.	
9	 U.	Kekkonen,	Nie szukajcie przyjaciół daleko, a wrogów blisko,	Warszawa	1983.
10	 The	penalty	of	up	to	two	years’	imprisonment	for	journalists	publishing	libellous	materi-
als	about	other	countries	(implicitly	the	USSR)	was	removed	from	the	criminal	code	only	
in	1995.	D.	Arter,	Kekkonen and the ‘Dark Age’ of Finlandised Politics?,	“Irish	Studies	in	Interna-
tional	Affairs”,	1998,	p.	41;	C.	Browning,	M.	Lehti,	Beyond East-West: marginality and national 
dignity in Finnish identity construction,	University	of	Warwick,	p.	21.
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Finland	entered	into	a	free	trade	agreement	with	the	EEC11,	while	still	being	
bound	by	long-term	trade	agreements	with	the	USSR.	
The	desire	to	keep	Finland	out	of	the	great	powers’	rivalry	and	the	narrative	
of	friendship	with	the	USSR	(combined	with	the	officially	dictated	amnesia	
as	regards,	for	example,	territorial	losses)	were	an	effect	of	both	pressure	from	
Moscow	and	independent	Finnish	reflection.	It	was	assumed	that	Finland	could	
never	again	become	engaged	in	a	war	against	the	USSR	because	it	might	put	the	
survival	of	this	small	nation	at	stake	in	the	nuclear	epoch.	The	Finnish	national	
hero,	Marshal	Carl	Gustaf	Mannerheim	(he	served	as	president	in	1944–1946)	
backed	defence	co-operation	with	the	USSR	and	personally	drafted	the	proposal	
for	the	Finnish-Soviet	treaty	in	194512.	
The	policy	of	building	special	Finnish-Soviet	relations	known	as	Finlandisation	
was	pursued	by	Urho	Kekkonen	from	the	agrarian	party	(currently	the	Cen-
tre	Party)	who	served	as	Finland’s	president	for	many	years	(1956–1982).	Fin-
landisation	had	both	international	and	domestic	dimensions.	Firstly,	it	meant	
respecting	the	Kremlin’s	interests	in	foreign	and	security	policy	so	that	Fin-
land	could	preserve	political	pluralism	and	a	free-market	economy.	Secondly,	
Finlandisation	entailed	Finland’s	most	senior	politicians	seeking	the	Kremlin’s	
support,	which	was	helpful	in	the	domestic	power	struggle13.	One	example	was	
President	Kekkonen’s	use	of	crises	in	relations	with	Moscow	to	strengthen	his	
position	at	home	by	building	the	image	of	a	politician	who	had	an	exclusive	
recipe	for	warming	relations	with	the	Kremlin.	The	most	important	‘side	effects’	
of	Finlandisation	included	the	Soviet	interferences	in	Finland’s	domestic	affairs	
and	the	Soviet	special	services’	infiltration	of	the	Finnish	political	and	busi-
ness	elites.	It	can	even	be	said	that	there	was	an	informal	alliance	between	
President	Kekkonen	and	the	KGB	at	the	time	of	the	Cold	War;	and	both	sides	
benefited	from	this	alliance.	On	the	one	hand,	Kekkonen	did	not	allow	Finnish	
communists	to	monopolise	contacts	with	Soviet	special	services	(the	Finnish	
People’s	Democratic	League	until	the	1980s	was	one	of	the	strongest	political	
parties	in	parliament)	and	through	his	collaboration	with	the	KGB	he	gained	the	
11	 P.	Sutela,	Finnish trade with the USSR: Why was it different?,	BOFIT,	2005,	p.	6,	https://helda.
helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/handle/123456789/12616/118461.pdf?sequence=1	
12	 He	argued	that	“Finland	can	no	 longer	assume	the	role	of	a	Western	fortress	against	 the	
East.	We	must	leave	such	talk	behind	(…).	Our	army	will	never	again	fight	a	war	against	
Russia”.	R.	Penttilä,	op. cit.,	pp.	12–13.
13	 J.	Lavery,	All of the President’s Historians: The Debate over Urho Kekkonen,	“Scandinavian	Stud-
ies”,	vol.	75,	no.	3,	2003,	pp.	378–381.
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Soviet	Union’s	consent	for	Finland	to	develop	economic	relations	with	the	West.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	KGB	gained	significant	freedom	for	its	covert	operations	
in	Finland	and	influence	on	the	Finnish	ministry	of	the	interior	and	the	police14.	
Kekkonen’s	system	was	also	used	by	the	governing	parties	to	marginalise	the	
political	right	(the	National	Coalition	Party)15.
The	collapse	of	the	USSR	for	Finland	meant	reorientation	to	the	West	and	the	
end	of	its	subordination	to	Moscow.	However,	Finlandisation	has	left	a	durable	
mark	on	Finnish	political	culture	and	the	perception	of	Russia.	Even	though	
in	2016	59%	of	Finns	were	of	the	opinion	that	Russia’s	moves	adversely	affect	
Finland’s	security,	at	the	same	time,	83%	of	respondents	believed	that	the	Rus-
sian	president,	Vladimir	Putin,	is	welcome	in	their	country16.	
14	 K.	Rentola,	President Urho Kekkonen of Finland and the KGB,	2008,	https://helda.helsinki.fi/
handle/10224/4054
15	 This	situation	was	analogous	to	the	inter-war	period,	when	the	governing	political	centre-
right	isolated	the	social	democrats.
16	 11%	were	of	 the	opposite	opinion.	Putin saapuu tänään Suomeen,	 “Aamulehti”,	 1	 July	2016,	
https://www.aamulehti.fi/kotimaa/putin-saapuu-tanaan-suomeen-kysely-suurin-osa-
kansasta-toivottaa-tervetulleeksi-23760173/;	Finns'  opinions on foreign and security policy, 
national defence and security,	Ministry	of	Defence	of	Finland,	December	2016,	http://www.
defmin.fi/files/3579/ABDI_(MTS)_December_2016_Report_in_english.pdf	
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II. ruSSIA: An opporTunITy And A THrEAT
Finland	views	Russia	 simultaneously	 as	 a	 source	 of	 opportunities	 (mainly	
economic)	and	as	the	greatest	threat	to	its	sovereignty.	From	Finland’s	point	
of	 view,	 developing	 co-operation	with	 Russia	 results	 in	 reducing	 the	 risk	
of	bilateral	tensions.	This	approach	is	of	key	significance	for	understanding	
the	Finnish	strategy	towards	Russia	that	combines	military	deterrence	with	
efforts	to	maintain	good	political	and	economic	relations.	The	intensive	political	
contacts	with	Russia,	inherited	after	the	Cold	War,	have	been	used	by	Finnish	
politicians	to	build	support	on	the	domestic	arena	and	to	aspire	to	playing	the	
role	of	a	broker	between	the	West	and	Russia.	In	economic	terms,	Russia	is	Fin-
land’s	most	important	trade	partner	outside	the	EU	and	a	source	of	supplies	
of	natural	resources.	From	Finland’s	perspective,	the	Russian	market	has	an	
unlimited	capacity	to	receive	Finnish	exports	and	direct	investments	(Peters-
burg	and	Leningrad	Oblast	alone	have	more	residents	than	Finland	as	a	whole).	
Russia	appreciates	its	political	dialogue	and	economic	co-operation	with	Fin-
land.	However,	it	is	aware	of	the	fact	that	Helsinki,	despite	its	pragmatic	rela-
tions	with	Moscow,	is	unable	to	significantly	influence	the	EU’s	policy	towards	
Russia	(for	example,	on	lifting	the	sanctions).	Russia	has	also	strongly	criticised	
Finland’s	participation	in	military	co-operation	with	NATO	and	the	USA.	It	has	
regularly	demonstrated	that	it	is	ready	to	counteract	any	potential	attempts	
to	 change	Finland’s	policy	of	non-alignment,	 employing	both	military	 and	
hybrid	means.	In	turn,	on	the	social	level,	Finland	is	a	frequent	leisure	and	
business	destination	for	the	Saint	Petersburg	middle	class	and	the	Kremlin	elite.	
1. russia as a source of opportunities
(1) The political opportunities. The	special	nature	of	Finnish-Russian	relations	
is	manifested	in	regular	contacts	of	the	presidents	and	prime	ministers	from	
the	two	countries.	The	presidents	of	Finland	and	Russia	as	a	rule	meet	twice	
a	year17.	President	Sauli	Niinistö	to	this	effect	continues	the	policy	of	his	pre-
decessor,	Tarja	Halonen	(president	2000–2012).	This	offers	Russia	the	occasion	
to	demonstrate	that	there	are	countries	in	the	EU	that	are	willing	to	maintain	
good	relations	with	it,	while	Finnish	politicians	have	the	opportunity	to	present	
17	 The	president	in	Finnish	political	culture	performs	the	function	of	the	guarantor	of	good	
relations	with	Moscow.	The	 annexation	 of	Crimea	has	not	 affected	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	
presidential	meetings	–	in	2014–2017	Sauli	Niinistö	and	Vladimir	Putin	held	eight	bilateral	
meetings.
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themselves	as	responsible	actors	in	relations	with	a	powerful	neighbour.	Fur-
thermore,	Finland	wants	to	play	the	role	of	a	pragmatic	state	which	is	an	expert	
in	Russian	affairs	and	a	non-aligned	bridge	between	the	West	and	Moscow,	
which	is	expected	to	raise	its	international	prestige.	The	role	of	the	intermedi-
ary	dates	back	to	the	times	when	Finland	was	engaged	in	the	Cold	War	détente	
policy.	In	1973–1975,	it	hosted	negotiations	between	Western	countries	and	the	
Eastern	Bloc	as	part	of	the	Conference	for	Security	and	Co-operation	in	Europe	
(the	so-called	‘Helsinki	Process’	which	ended	in	the	signing	of	the	CSCE	Final	
Act).	Examples	of	this	tradition	being	drawn	upon	are:	the	talks	of	representa-
tives	of	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	the	US	Department	of	State	
in	Helsinki	in	September	201718,	and	the	work	under	the	auspices	of	Finland	
underway	since	2016	as	part	of	the	International	Civil	Aviation	Organization	
(ICAO)	to	improve	the	safety	of	flights	in	the	Baltic	Sea	region	in	connection	
with	the	numerous	incidents	in	the	airspace	between	Russia	and	NATO	since	
the	annexation	of	Crimea19.	
However,	the	special	nature	of	Finnish-Russian	relations	should	not	be	viewed	
as	‘neo-Finlandisation’.	The	role	of	the	Russian	factor	in	Finland’s	foreign	policy	
has	been	reduced	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	as	compared	to	the	Cold	War	
period.	However,	Finland	maintains	a	political	consensus	as	regards	the	need	
to	develop	good	relations	with	Russia.	Political	parties	only	disagree	about	the	
extent	to	which	the	desire	to	keep	good	relations	is	to	affect	Finland’s	security	
policy.	The	centre-left	views	itself	as	the	guardian	of	President	Kekkonen’s	leg-
acy	and	is	more	willing	than	the	political	centre-right	to	take	Russian	security	
interests	into	consideration	in	Finnish	strategic	thinking.	
(2) The economic opportunities. The	well-developed	Finnish-Soviet	trade	rela-
tions	originated	from	Finland’s	payment	of	war	reparations.	The	need	to	sup-
ply	goods	to	the	USSR	as	part	of	reparations	led	to	the	emergence	of	branches	
of	industry	specialised	in	exports	to	the	Soviet	Union	(mainly	products	of	the	
electromechanical	and	shipbuilding	industries)	as	part	of	five-year	trade	agree-
ments	implemented	from	1950.	Russia	was	Finland’s	largest	trade	partner	until	
2013	(with	a	break	in	the	1990s	caused	by	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	which	brought	
about	an	economic	recession	in	Finland).	In	effect	of	the	financial	crisis	in	2008,	
the	EU-Russian	sanctions	and	counter-sanctions	after	2014,	the	devaluation	
18	 Under Secretary Shannon Travel to Helsinki, Finland,	U.S.	Department	of	State,	9	September	
2017,	https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/09/273930.htm	
19	 J.	 Gotkowska,	 P.	 Szymański,	 Rosyjski „plan Niinistö”,	 “OSW	 Analyses”,	 24	 August	 2016,	
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-08-24/rosyjski-plan-niinisto	
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of	the	rouble,	and	low	oil	prices,	it	fell	to	third	to	find	itself	behind	Germany	
and	Sweden	(2016).	The	value	of	Finnish	exports	to	Russia	in	2008–2016	was	
reduced	more	than	three-fold.	Russia’s	share	in	Finnish	exports	and	imports	
in	2016	reached	5.7%	(5th	position)	and	11.2%	(3rd	position)	respectively20.	Fin-
land	exports	to	Russia	mainly	products	of	the	chemical	and	timber	and	paper	
industries,	and	industrial	and	electric	machines.	It	imports	mainly	energy	prod-
ucts.	In	2016,	their	share	in	total	imports	from	Russia	reached	70.5%	(including	
58.2%	of	oil	and	7.1%	of	gas)21.	For	Russia,	Finland	is	an	outlet	of	limited,	mainly	
regional	significance.	Helsinki	wants	to	revive	trade	with	Russia	in	the	areas	
which	are	not	covered	by	Russian	sanctions.	It	is	intended	to	stimulate	Finnish	
exports	but	also	to	maintain	the	position	of	Finnish	companies	on	the	Russian	
market22.	Finland	remains	in	the	EU’s	mainstream	as	regards	continuing	the	
sanctions	imposed	on	Russia.	However,	if	the	stance	of	the	key	EU	member	
states	changes	(in	particular,	that	of	Germany),	considering	Finland’s	economic	
interests,	it	would	not	find	itself	in	the	group	of	countries	opposing	the	lifting	
of	the	sanctions.	
Energy	co-operation,	which	more	than	other	areas	has	enabled	Finland	to	fill	
bilateral	relations	with	Russia	with	real	content	over	the	past	few	years,	has	
the	greatest	significance	as	regards	direct	investments23.	The	Finnish	state-con-
trolled	energy	company	Fortum	owns	eight	heat	and	power	plants	in	central	
20	 Finnish exports to Russia finally on the rise,	 BOFIT,	 3	March	2017,	https://www.bofit.fi/en/
monitoring/weekly/2017/vw201709_3/;	 Finnish foreign trade 2016: Figures and diagrams,	
Finnish	Customs,	7	February	2017,	http://tulli.fi/documents/2912305/3437550/Figures+an
d+diagrams+2016+%28preliminary+data%29/b2fc0c2b-a4eb-4410-a53d-1e961ae2273a	
21	 In	2016,	Finland	imported	100%	of	its	gas	from	Russia	(6%	of	total	energy	consumption)	and	
88%	of	 its	oil	 (23%	of	 total	energy	consumption).	Finland	views	Russia	as	a	reliable	sup-
plier	of	oil	and	gas	–	Helsinki	has	never	experienced	politically	motivated	cuts	in	oil	and	
gas	deliveries.	However,	 in	 the	 longer	 term,	Finland’s	dependence	on	 imports	 of	 energy	
resources	from	Russia	will	be	decreasing.	Helsinki	is	intensifying	a	diversification	of	gas	
supplies	 inside	 the	 EU	 (the	 construction	 of	 a	 gas	 pipeline	 connection	with	 Estonia	 and	
LNG	terminals)	and	 is	 investing	 in	renewables.	Energy supply and consumption,	Statistics	
Finland,	 23	 March	 2017,	 https://www.stat.fi/til/ehk/2016/04/ehk_2016_04_2017-03-23_
en.pdf;	Finland – Energy System Overview,	International	Energy	Agency,	2016,	https://www.
iea.org/media/countries/Finland.pdf	
22	 The	following	companies	are	among	those	present	on	the	Russian	market:	Fortum	(energy	
sector),	 K-Group	 (retail	 chain),	 YIT	 (construction	 sector),	 Neste	 (fuels),	 Nokian	 Tyres	
(tyres),	Fazer	(food	industry)	and	Stora	Enso,	UPM	and	Metsä	Group	(all	three:	forest	indus-
try	and	biomass).
23	 Finland’s	direct	investments	in	Russia	in	2014	reached	2.2	billion	euros	(2.3%	of	total	FDI),	
and	Russian	 investments	 in	Finland	were	half	 that	 (1.4%	of	 total	FDI).	Finnish investment 
in Russia continues to heavily exceed Russian investment in Finland,	BOFIT,	13	October	2015,	
https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2015/vw201546_3/	
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Russia,	hydro	and	thermal	power	plants	in	north-western	Russia	and	a	wind	
farm	in	Ulyanovsk24.	In	turn,	Rosatom	will	build	a	reactor	at	a	new	nuclear	power	
plant	in	Pyhäjoki.	The	implementation	of	this	controversial	project	is	planned	
for	2018–2024	and	will	be	of	key	significance	for	the	future	of	Finnish-Russian	
energy	co-operation	(it	still	needs	final	administrative	consent)25.	One	sign	
of	this	co-operation	is	also	Finland’s	neutral	stance	on	the	Nord	Stream	2	pro-
ject.	Pipes	for	the	construction	of	the	NS2	are	coated	and	stored	at	the	Finnish	
ports	Hamina-Kotka	and	Koverhar26.	Furthermore,	in	the	middle	of	2018,	For-
tum	will	become	the	main	shareholder	at	the	German	energy	company	Uni-
per,	which	is	a	partner	in	the	NS2	project	(Uniper	also	owns	five	power	plants	
in	Russia).	This	means	that	the	Finnish	government	will	indirectly	become	part	
of	this	undertaking.
Finland	wants	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 benefits	 of	 using	 the	Arctic	Northeast	
Passage	connecting	Europe	and	Asia,	which	may	contribute	to	the	economic	
development	 of	 Finnish	Lapland.	 Finland	 is	 also	 counting	 on	 co-operation	
with	Russia	as	regards	construction	of	 the	Russian	fleet	of	 icebreakers	and	
in	the	Arctic	Connect	project	–	the	laying	of	an	underwater	telecommunica-
tion	cable	along	Russia’s	Arctic	seashore	(10,500	km)	that	would	connect	China	
and	Japan	with	Europe	via	Russia,	Norway	and	Finland	(using	the	Helsinki–	
–Rostock	connection)27.	Additionally,	despite	the	development	of	cargo	capacity	
of	Ust-Luga	Port	by	Russia,	Finnish	ports	in	the	Gulf	of	Finland	are	important	
24	 Fortum in Russia,	 https://www3.fortum.com/about-us/our-company/fortum-worldwide/
fortum-russia	
25	 Rosatom	holds	a	35%	stake	in	Fennovoima,	a	company	set	to	build	the	new	nuclear	power	
plant.The	project	has	sparked	controversies	since	the	beginning	–	in	2014,	the	Greens	left	
the	government	coalition	in	protest	against	further	investments	in	the	nuclear	energy	sec-
tor,	and	in	2015,	the	Finnish	government	blocked	the	participation	in	Fennovoima	of	a	com-
pany	registered	in	Croatia	due	to	its	links	to	Russian	capital.	The	establishment	of	this	com-
pany	was	most	 likely	inspired	by	Russia	to	resolve	the	problem	with	the	lack	of	the	60%	
share	of	entities	from	the	EU	in	Fennovoima	required	by	the	Finnish	side.	Two	two-reactor	
nuclear	power	plants	built	in	the	1970s	operate	in	Finland:	Loviisa	and	Olkiluoto	(they	will	
be	decommissioned	in	2027–2042).	The	construction	of	a	third	reactor	in	Olkiluoto	is	con-
tinued	with	delays.
26	 The	 former	 social	 democratic	 prime	minister,	 Paavo	 Lipponen,	was	 hired	 as	 an	 advisor	
by	the	Nord	Stream	company	when	the	first	two	lines	of	the	gas	pipeline	were	constructed.	
27	 Report on the Northeast Passage telecommunications cable project,	Ministry	of	Transport	and	
Communications	of	Finland,	Report	3/2016,	https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/880507/
Reports+3-2016.pdf/db8fcdda-af98-4a50-950d-61c18d133f74.	 Russian	 investments	 are	
important	for	the	Finnish	shipbuilding	industry	–	the	Russian	United	Shipbuilding	Corpo-
ration	owns	the	Helsinki	shipyards	where	icebreakers	are	built	also	for	the	Russian	Minis-
try	of	Transport	(information	was	received	towards	the	end	of	2017	that	Russians	are	plan-
ning	to	sell	the	shipyard).
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for	Russian	imports	via	the	Baltic	Sea	(goods,	after	unloading,	are	delivered	
by	road	and	railway	transport	to	Russia)28.
In	the	services	area,	Russian	tourists	are	an	important	source	of	income	mainly	
in	Helsinki	and	the	frontier	regions,	being	the	largest	group	of	foreigners	visit-
ing	Finland.	According	to	data	from	the	Russian	statistical	office,	in	2016	Fin-
land	was	the	second	most	frequently	chosen	destination	for	Russians	travelling	
abroad29.	
2. russia as a source of threats 
(1) The political threats. Russia	poses	a	political	threat	to	Finland	on	three	
levels.	Firstly,	on	the	international	level,	Helsinki	is	particularly	concerned	
with	the	Russian	focus	on	multipolarity,	which	is	a	long-term	challenge	to	the	
durability	of	Finland’s	integration	with	Western	structures.	The	Russian	vision	
of	the	international	order	includes	the	concept	of	great	powers’	spheres	of	influ-
ence,	with	Finland	being	assigned	the	role	of	a	buffer	zone	between	the	West	
and	Russia.	From	Russian	perspective	this	excludes	for	example	Finland’s	NATO	
membership.	Russia	thus	wants	to	maintain	the	remnants	of	the	Cold	War	‘Nor-
dic	balance’,	elements	of	which	 included	the	Finno-Soviet	Treaty,	Sweden’s	
neutrality	and	Denmark’s	and	Norway’s	NATO	membership	(however,	with	no	
NATO	bases).	
Secondly,	on	the	political	and	business	level,	the	Russian	special	services	are	
still	active	in	Finland	even	though	the	Finlandisation	policy	was	discontinued	
in	1991.	A	report	of	the	Finnish	Security	Intelligence	Service	(Supo)	for	2016	men-
tions	a	significant	number	of	agents	from	other	countries	operating	in	Finland,	
but	only	Russia’s	name	is	mentioned	explicitly30.	The	activity	of	foreign	intelli-
gence	in	Finland	is	concentrated	on	recruiting	young	politicians	and	obtaining	
information	on	topics	such	as	support	for	NATO	membership,	energy	policy,	the	
attitude	of	business	circles	towards	the	EU	sanctions,	the	Finnish	chairmanship	
28	 Finland as a Gateway to Russia, Baltics and the Nordic Region,	Embassy	of	Finland	in	the	USA,	
5	 June	2013,	http://www.finland.org/public/default.aspx?contentid=275909&nodeid=3583
3&contentlan=2&culture=en-US	
29	 Число выездных туристских поездок,	Federal	State	Statistics	Service	of	Russian	Federa-
tion,	http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/business/torg/tur/tab-tur1-2.htm;	Demand for 
accommodation services grew by 3 per cent in 2016,	Statistics	Finland,	27	April	2017,	https://
www.stat.fi/til/matk/2016/matk_2016_2017-04-27_tie_001_en.html	
30	 SUPO 2016,	Finnish	Security	Intelligence	Service,	http://www.supo.fi/instancedata/prime_
product_julkaisu/intermin/embeds/supowwwstructure/72829_SUPO_2016_ENG.pdf
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of	the	Arctic	Council	(2017–2019)	and	cyber	security	infrastructure31.	Charac-
teristic	areas	of	activity	of	Russia’s	special	services	include	monitoring	the	cases	
of	taking	custody	of	children	from	Russian	families	in	Finland	(this	informa-
tion	is	then	publicised	in	the	Russian	press	to	acuse	Finns	of	Russophobia)	and	
attempts	to	recruit	agents	among	holders	of	dual	Finnish-Russian	citizenship32.	
However,	Russia	does	not	play	the	card	of	the	Russian-speaking	minority	in	Fin-
land	(around	70,000	people)	to	the	extent	it	does	in	the	Baltic	states.
Thirdly,	on	the	level	of	society,	Russia	wants	to	influence	Finnish	public	opin-
ion.	In	this	area,	Russia’s	goals	include:	undermining	public	confidence	in	the	
government,	weakening	people’s	pro-European	orientation	and	entrenching	
the	low	level	of	support	for	NATO	membership.	Moscow	has	employed	various	
tools	to	achieve	these	goals.	For	example,	in	late	2015/early	2016	a	migration	
route	(around	1,700	people)	was	formed	on	the	Finnish-Russian	border	in	the	
Far	North	most	likely	with	the	participation	of	Russian	security	services	and	
organised	criminal	groups33.	These	moves	were	aimed	at	escalating	the	largest	
asylum	crisis	in	Finland’s	post-war	history	(an	influx	of	around	32,000	asylum-
seekers	from	the	Middle	East)	and,	as	a	consequence,	a	further	polarisation	
of	the	Finnish	public	over	receiving	migrants	and	refugees.	It	entailed	increas-
ing	support	for	radical	organisations	(Soldiers	of	Odin,	the	Finnish	Resistance	
Movement)	and	slogans	contesting	the	mainstream	policy.	
Finland	is	also	one	of	the	fronts	of	the	Russian	information	war,	even	though	
its	linguistic	distinctness	and	high	education	level	pose	a	barrier	to	Russian	
31	 Russia	is	not	the	only	country	interested	in	these	issues,	but	it	is	certain	that	they	attract	
the	special	attention	of	the	Russian	intelligence.	
32	 One	proof	of	 this	 is	 the	Finnish	debate	on	blocking	holders	of	dual	Finnish-Russian	citi-
zenship	 the	right	 to	serve	 in	 the	Finnish	armed	forces	and	border	guard	(the	ministries	
of	defence	and	interior	are	working	on	relevant	legal	changes).	In	2015,	the	number	of	hold-
ers	of	dual	citizenship	in	Finland	reached	95,000.	Russians	form	the	largest	group	among	
them	–	25,000	people	(followed	by	Swedes	–	7,000	people	and	Estonians	–	4,000).	Around	
60	holders	of	dual	citizenship	serve	in	the	armed	forces.	Number of persons receiving Finnish 
citizenship fell in 2015,	Statistics	Finland,	12	April	2016,	https://www.stat.fi/til/kans/2015/
kans_2015_2016-05-12_tie_001_en.html;	 J.	 Huhtanen,	 Puolustusministeri Niinistö pitää 
kaksois kansalaisia turvallisuus uhkana – ‘Viides kolonna on torjuttava jo rauhan aikana’,	“Hels-
ingin	Sanomat”,	22	January	2018,	https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005534143.html	
33	 Finally,	 Finland	 and	 Russia	 signed	 an	 agreement	 introducing	 temporary	 restrictions	
on	border	 traffic	 in	 the	Far	North.	P.	Szymański,	P.	Żochowski,	W.	Rodkiewicz,	Enforced 
cooperation: the Finnish-Russian migration crisis,	“OSW	Analyses”, 6	April	2016,	https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/enforced-cooperation-finnish-russian-
migration-crisis
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disinformation34.	Pro-Kremlin	 internet	 ‘trolling’	has	 intensified	 in	Finland	
since	 2014	 (concerning	 such	 issues	 as	 the	wars	 in	Ukraine	 and	 Syria).	An	
attempt	to	launch	a	pro-Russian	radio	(Love	FM,	2016)	has	also	been	made.	Rus-
sian	propaganda	in	Finland	is	facilitated	by	pro-Kremlin	activists	and	some	
organisations,	for	example	the	Finnish	Anti-Fascist	Committee.	In	turn,	the	
Russian	media,	depending	on	the	needs,	present	Finland	occasionally	as	a	coun-
try	preparing	for	war	with	Russia	and	entering	into	secret	military	deals,	and	
at	other	times	as	Moscow’s	trusted	partner	in	the	EU35.	For	this	reason	Finland	
formed	a	special	group	of	experts	and	public	servants	at	the	prime	minister’s	
office	in	2015	tasked	with	monitoring	and	counteracting	disinformation36.	
(2)	The economic threats.	Trade	and	energy	co-operation	with	Russia	is	not	only	
a	source	of	economic	and	political	opportunities	for	Finland,	it	also	has	negative	
implications.	The	dependence	of	some	sectors	of	the	Finnish	economy	on	the	
Russian	market	exposes	companies	to	losses	should	political	relations	between	
Moscow	and	Helsinki	deteriorate	(or	in	the	broader	context,	between	Russia	
and	the	EU).	The	Russian	counter-sanctions	imposed	in	2014	(embargo	on	food	
from	the	EU)	above	all	affected	the	Finnish	dairy	industry,	causing	the	emer-
gence	of	groups	of	manufacturers	lobbying	for	the	EU	sanctions	to	be	lifted37.	
In	2015–2016,	Finnish	food	exports	to	Russia,	which	had	been	the	most	impor-
tant	outlet	for	Finnish	manufacturers,	fell	three-fold38.	Another	example	is	the	
re-emerging	threat	of	withholding	Russian	exports	of	timber	to	Finland	(for	the	
needs	of	the	Finnish	forest	industry	and	biomass).	The	Russian	parliament	was	
34	 In	2016,	Sputnik	closed	its	websites	in	the	Finnish,	Swedish,	Norwegian	and	Danish	lan-
guages.	
35	 Collective	work,	Russia’s footprint in the Nordic-Baltic information environment,	NATO	Stra-
tegic	Communications	Centre	of	Excellence,	January	2018,	https://www.stratcomcoe.org/
russias-footprint-nordic-baltic-information-environment-0,	pp.	60–66,	73–74.
36	 J.	Rosendahl,	T.	Forsell,	Finland sees propaganda attack from former master Russia,	Reuters,	
19	October	 2016,	 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-russia-informationattacks/
finland-sees-propaganda-attack-from-former-master-russia-idUSKCN12J197	
37	 Finland	is	in	the	group	of	those	EU	member	states	which	have	sustained	the	largest	losses	
as	a	result	of	the	Russian	sanctions.	J.	Hinz,	Friendly fire. Zu den Handelsauswirkungen der 
Russlandsanktionen,	 IfW,	 December	 2017,	 https://www.ifw-kiel.de/wirtschaftspolitik/
prognosezentrum/konjunkt/ifw-box/2017/box_2017-17_russlandsanktionen.pdf	 How-
ever,	in	aggregate,	the	estimates	of	the	Finnish	Ministry	of	Finance	were	indicating	a	small	
effect	of	 the	Russian	ban	on	 food	 imports	on	 the	reduction	of	Finland’s	GDP	(by	0.1	per-
centage	points)	and	a	marginal	 influence	on	 the	unemployment	rate.	The economic effects 
of the EU’s Russia sanctions and Russia’s counter sanctions,	Ministry	 of	 Finance	 of	 Finland,	
27	 August	 2014,	 http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10184/1058456/venaja_pakotteet_
en.pdf/11184e4f-b00a-4474-9576-66c89d9e18ae	
38	 J.	Niemi,	Finnish food exports to Russia down more than 70 percent,	Natural	Resources	Institute	Fin-
land,	2	August	2017,	https://www.luke.fi/en/news/finnish-food-exports-russia-70-percent/	
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considering	the	imposition	of	restrictions	on	wood	trade	with	Finland	in	2015,	
when	Finland	did	not	allow	the	Russian	delegation	to	participate	in	the	OSCE’s	
Parliamentary	Assembly	in	Helsinki	due	to	EU	sanctions.	Furthermore,	in	2015,	
two	entrepreneurs	and	four	companies	from	Finland	found	themselves	on	the	
US	sanctions	list.	The	Department	of	the	Treasury	argued	that	this	decision	
was	taken	because	the	Finnish	entities	disregarded	the	US	sanctions	imposed	
on	the	Russian	oligarchs	Gennady	Timchenko	and	Boris	Rotenberg	after	the	
annexation	of	Crimea39.	
Direct	investments	of	Finnish	firms	in	Russia	may	also	serve	as	a	bargaining	
chip	in	Finnish-Russian	relations.	Their	opportunities	of	expansion	or	retaining	
position	on	the	Russian	market	may	depend	on	concessions	offered	to	Moscow.	
The	change	of	the	stance	taken	by	Finland’s	Fortum	on	the	participation	in	the	
Fennovoima	project	most	 likely	fits	 in	with	this	model.	The	Finnish	energy	
company	initially	was	not	interested	in	co-operation	with	Rosatom.	However,	
when	the	problem	with	ensuring	a	majority	stake	of	EU-based	firms	followed	
by	political	pressure	appeared,	Fortum,	which	owns	significant	assets	in	Russia,	
joined	the	consortium	engaged	in	the	construction	of	the	new	nuclear	power	
plant40.	This	was	most	likely	an	effect	of	the	talks	that	were	held	at	the	same	
time	between	Fortum	and	Gazprom	on	Fortum	taking	over	a	majority	stake	
in	the	Russian	energy	company	TGK-1	operating	in	Leningrad	and	Murmansk	
Oblasts	and	in	the	Republic	of	Karelia41.	The	new	Finnish-Russian	nuclear	power	
plant	in	Finland	will	provide	further	motivation	for	the	Finnish	government	
to	maintain	good	relations	with	Russia,	regardless	of	the	international	situ-
ation.	As	a	result,	Finland	may	find	itself	in	a	difficult	situation	in	the	future	
–	Finnish	experts	point	out	that	there	is	the	risk	that	Rosatom	may	be	placed	
on	the	list	of	companies	covered	by	US	and	EU	sanctions42.	
39	 Both	oligarchs	have	Finnish	citizenship	and	have	invested	in	Finland.	Treasury Sanctions 
Individuals and Entities Involved In Sanctions Evasion Related To Russia and Ukraine,	 U.S.	
Department	of	 the	Treasury,	30	 July	2015,	https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0133.aspx	
40	 T.	Martikainen,	 A.	 Vihma,	Dividing the EU with energy? Unpacking Russia’s energy geoeco-
nomics,	FIIA,	1	March	2016,	http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/571/dividing_the_eu_with_
energy/
41	 Researcher: Horse-trading behind planned Fortum-Fennovoima deal,	 YLE,	 2	 December	 2014,	
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/researcher_horse-trading_behind_planned_fortum-
fennovoima_deal/7665234	
42	 T.	Martikainen,	K.	Pynnöniemi,	S.	Saari,	Venäjän muuttuva rooli Suomen lähialueilla,	FIIA,	
30	August	2016,	http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/607/venajan_muuttuva_rooli_suomen_
lahialueilla/	
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Furthermore,	from	the	point	of	view	of	Finland,	which	is	building	its	brand	
by	promoting	Finnish	nature,	Russia	 is	a	country	 that	pollutes	 the	natural	
environment	in	its	immediate	neighbourhood.	For	this	reason	the	Finnish	side	
raises	the	issue	of	the	protection	of	the	natural	environment	in	the	Baltic	Sea	
(the	Krasny	Bor	dump	site	near	Saint	Petersburg	pollutes	the	waters	of	the	Gulf	
of	Finland)	and	in	the	Arctic	(the	reduction	of	CO2	emissions)	during	all	Finnish-
Russian	meetings	on	the	presidential	and	prime	ministerial	level.	
(3) The military threats. Regardless	of	the	positive	changes	that	have	taken	
place	in	Finland’s	security	environment	as	the	result	of	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	
such	us	the	restoration	of	the	Baltic	states’	independence	and	weakening	of	Rus-
sia’s	military	power,	Finland	never	stopped	perceiving	Moscow	as	a	strategic	
challenge	and	threat	to	its	sovereignty.	Finland’s	border	with	Russia	is	1,340	km	
long	and	 it	 runs	along	areas	of	military	 importance	 for	 the	Kremlin:	Saint	
Petersburg	(the	Navy	headquarters)	and	the	Kola	Peninsula	(the	Northern	Fleet	
base).	Furthermore,	since	Poland	and	the	Baltic	states	joined	NATO,	the	border	
between	the	alliance	and	Russia	has	been	shifted	closer	to	Finland’s	southern	
frontier.	
Finnish	politicians	and	military	officials	formally	declare	that	there	is	no	direct	
threat	of	Russian	aggression.	However,	Finland’s	entire	military	potential	since	
the	end	of	the	Cold	War	has	been	developed	and	profiled	to	conduct	a	defence	
operation	in	case	of	a	Russian	attack.	The	fact	that	it	has	retained	a	conscript	
army	focused	on	territorial	defence	with	a	large	trained	reserve	proves	that	Fin-
land	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	of	a	classic	land	invasion	(with	a	key	role	
of	Karelian	Isthmus	direction).	However,	Finnish	experts	believe	that	a	Finnish-
Russian	war	that	is	not	part	of	a	broader	Russia–NATO	conflict	is	unlikely,	and	
that	a	potential	conflict	in	the	Nordic-Baltic	region	would	most	likely	involve	
Russian	strikes	on	Finland’s	naval	and	air	bases	in	order	to	prevent	NATO	from	
using	them,	for	example,	to	defend	the	Baltic	states.	Nor	are	they	ruling	out	
the	possibility	of	a	subversive	actions	according	to	the	scheme	adopted	by	Rus-
sians	during	the	annexation	of	Crimea	(for	example,	on	the	demilitarised	Aland	
Islands)43.	
43	 The	 status	 of	 the	 archipelago	 makes	 its	 defence	 more	 difficult,	 which	 was	 the	 sub-
ject	of	debate	 in	Finland	 in	 the	 1990s	and	after	 the	annexation	of	Crimea.	 J.	Gotkowska,	
P.	Szymański,	Gotland and Åland on the Baltic chessboard – Swedish and Finnish concerns,	“OSW	
Analyses”,	26	October	2016,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-10-26/
gotland-and-aland-baltic-chessboard-swedish-and-finnish-concerns
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Finland	 is	concerned	about	Russia’s	 increasing	military	capabilities	and	 its	
heightened	military	activity	near	the	Finnish	frontier	 in	recent	years.	This	
includes	an	intensification	of	military	exercises,	the	reactivation	of	the	mecha-
nised	brigade	in	Alakurtti	(50	km	from	the	Finnish	border)	and	the	violations	
of	Finnish	airspace	by	Russian	aircrafts	(alien	underwater	activity	was	also	
spotted	in	the	Finnish	territorial	sea	in	2015).	Finland	reads	all	this	as	a	warning	
against	further	enhancing	military	co-operation	with	NATO	and	the	USA,	and	
a	demonstration	of	Russia’s	capability	to	block	potential	joint	military	action	
with	NATO	in	case	of	conflict	in	the	region.	Russia	straightforwardly	defines	
Finnish-NATO	co-operation	as	a	threat	to	its	security	and	declares	that	Fin-
land’s	NATO	membership	would	result	in	an	adjustment	of	the	Russian	mili-
tary	posture	to	the	new	situation	in	the	region44.	Russia	wants	to	build	a	sense	
of	uncertainty	about	its	reaction	to	the	shift	in	the	balance	of	power	in	the	
Nordic-Baltic	region,	which	is	expected	to	entrench	the	status quo	as	regards	
Finland’s	non-aligned	status.
Public	opinion	polls	have	revealed	that	the	sense	of	 threat	 from	Russia	has	
intensified	among	the	Finnish	public	since	the	Russian	aggression	on	Ukraine,	
even	though	terrorism,	organised	crime,	the	economic	crisis	and	global	warm-
ing	are	viewed	as	more	serious	threats45.	The	Russian	threat	has	such	a	distant	
place	in	the	poll	on	the	one	hand	because	this	topic	is	on	the	margins	of	public	
debate	and,	on	the	other	because	Finns	are	used	to	the	neighbourhood	with	
Russia	and	trust	their	public	institutions,	in	particular,	the	army	(this	level	
of	trust	is	the	highest	in	the	EU).
44	 S.	 Blank,	 General Makarov Makes Incendiary Remarks in Finland,	 “Eurasia	 Daily	 Moni-
tor”,	 18	 July	 2012,	 https://jamestown.org/program/general-makarov-makes-incendiary-
remarks-in-finland/	
45	 J.	 Raeste,	 J.	 Saarinen,	 Suomalaisten Venäjän-pelko kaksin-kertaistunut neljässä vuodessa,	
“Helsingin	Sanomat”,	27	September	2014,	http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/a1411744065107;	Finns' 
opinions on foreign and security policy, national defence and security,	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	
of	 Finland,	 November	 2017,	 http://www.defmin.fi/files/4062/Finns_opinions_on_For-
eign_and_Security_Policy_National_defence_and_security_november_2017.pdf	
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III. co-opErATIvE non-AlIgnmEnT 
During	the	Cold	War,	Finland’s	security	policy,	focused	on	ensuring	interna-
tional	 recognition	of	 its	declared	neutrality,	employed	above	all	diplomatic	
measures.	In	addition	to	building	trust	in	relations	with	the	USSR,	this	meant	
engagement	in	the	UN	system	which	manifested	itself,	for	example,	through	
participation	in	peacekeeping	operations.	Finland	capitalised	on	the	collapse	
of	the	USSR	to	accelerate	its	integration	with	the	West	encompassing	co-opera-
tion	with	NATO	as	part	of	Partnership	for	Peace	since	1994	and	EU	membership	
since	1995.	This	led	to	replacing	the	concept	of	neutrality	with	non-alignment,	
i.e.	remaining	outside	military	alliances	and	freely	shaping	its	policies	in	case	
of	conflict46.	
Finland’s	security	policy	is	based	on	four	pillars:	its	non-alignment,	 invest-
ments	in	its	own	defence	capabilities,	maintaining	good	relations	with	Rus-
sia,	and	military	co-operation	with	Western	partners	to	which	Helsinki	has	
attached	special	significance	since	the	annexation	of	Crimea	in	2014.	Finland	
views	this	co-operation	above	all	as	an	opportunity	to	improve	its	capability	
to	defend	its	own	territory	rather	than	preparation	to	join	the	NATO.	How-
ever,	a	section	of	Finland’s	political	left	and	centre	oppose	enhancing	defence	
co-operation	with	the	USA	and	NATO	in	response	to	growing	tension	in	the	
region	and	appeal	for	more	balancing	between	the	East	and	the	West.	The	most	
likely	scenario	in	the	coming	years	will	be	that	Finland	will	maintain	its	non-
aligned	status	while	actually	developing	military	co-operation	with	Sweden,	
the	USA,	NATO	and	as	part	of	the	EU.	The	main	motives	behind	this	strategy	
of	co-operative	non-alignment	will	remain	unchanged:	Finland’s	insufficient	
military	expenditure	and	the	Russian	threat.
1. co-operation with Sweden
The	Cold	War	division	of	Europe	prevented	the	development	of	Finnish-Swedish	
defence	co-operation	because	Sweden	was	part	of	the	West.	Since	the	1990s,	bilat-
eral	co-operation	has	been	impeded	due	to	the	differences	in	perceiving	threats	
and	the	development	of	different	defence	models	–	expeditionary	in	Sweden,	and	
one	focused	on	territorial	defence	in	Finland.	The	centre	of	gravity	was	the	co-
operation	of	the	two	countries’	navies	and	co-operation	in	crisis	management	
46	 At	present,	the	governmental	documents	include	a	statement	that	Finland	is	not	a	member	
of	a	military	alliance.	
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operations47.	In	2003,	Finland	and	Sweden	began	holding	cross-border	air	force	
exercises.	The	factors	that	triggered	the	intensification	of	Finnish-Swedish	mili-
tary	co-operation	were	at	first	the	financial	crisis	(looking	for	ways	to	save	money	
through	bilateral	and	multilateral	projects	as	part	of	NORDEFCO	since	2009)	and	
then	the	annexation	of	Crimea,	after	which	Sweden	became	focused	on	regional	
security.	Other	factors	that	contribute	to	their	co-operation	is	the	non-aligned	sta-
tus	of	the	two	countries	and	the	absence	of	political	controversies	–	94%	of	Finns	
want	closer	defence	bonds	with	Sweden48.
Through	 this	 bilateral	 co-operation	 Finland	wants	 to	 raise	 the	 possibility	
of	coordinated	Finnish-Swedish	response	in	case	of	crisis	or	conflict,	because	
the	success	of	Finland’s	defence	operation	to	a	great	extent	depends	on	Sweden.	
This	country	would	be	able	to	offer	military	support	to	Finland	fastest	of	all	and	
to	guarantee	the	transit	of	military	assistance.	Sweden’s	territory	could	also	
secure	strategic	depth	for	the	Finnish	armed	forces,	mainly	the	navy	and	the	air	
force	(refuelling	and	ammunition	replenishment	at	Swedish	bases).	These	two	
branches	of	both	countries’	armed	forces	have	developed	most	intense	co-opera-
tion	since	2014.	It	resulted	in	a	high	level	of	interoperability,	including	exercises	
according	to	the	joint	defence	scenario49.	Although	the	Finnish-Swedish	agree-
ments	on	strengthening	military	co-operation	envisage	the	mutual	use	of	each	
other’s	base	infrastructure,	they	regulate	defence	co-operation	at	peacetime	
and	do	not	impose	any	wartime	obligations50.	
Enhancing	military	 co-operation	with	Sweden	will	 gain	more	 significance	
in	Finland’s	defence	policy	(there	is	a	great	deal	of	unused	potential,	especially	
47	 C.	Salonius-Pasternak,	Deeper defence cooperation: Finland and Sweden together again?,	FIIA,	
3	December	2017,	https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/186091/bp163.pdf
48	 Finns'  opinions…,	November	2017,	op. cit.
49	 Examples	of	these	include	the	Northern	Coasts	and	Ruska	exercises	in	2017.	Northern Coasts 
exercise to deepen the bilateral cooperation between Finland and Sweden (FISE),	Finnish	Defence	
Forces,	 12	 September	 2017,	 http://merivoimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/nothern-
coasts-harjoituksessa-syvennetaan-fise-yhteistyota;	Ruska 17 and Baana 17 exercises taking 
place in October,	Finnish	Defence	Forces,	22	September	2017,	http://ilmavoimat.fi/en/arti-
cle/-/asset_publisher/ilmaoperaatioharjoitus-ruska-17-ja-lentotoimintaharjoitus-baana-
17-jarjestetaan-lokakuussa	
50	 They	additionally	provide	for	creating	a	joint	Swedish-Finnish	Naval	Task	Group	(by	2023),	
closer	co-operation	on	anti-submarine	warfare	(for	example	coordinated	purchase	of	Saab	
Dynamics	Ab	torpedoes)	and	developing	the	concept	of	a	combined	Finnish-Swedish	Bri-
gade	 (by	 2020).	Final reports on deepened defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden,	
Government	of	Sweden,	19	May	2015,	http://www.government.se/49baf3/globalassets/gov-
ernment/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/final-reports-on-deepened-defence-coopera-
tion-between-finland-och-sweden.pdf	
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in	the	case	of	the	land	forces).	However,	neither	Helsinki51	nor	Stockholm	is	con-
sidering	a	bilateral	military	alliance	at	present	(Stockholm	would	rather	choose	
NATO	membership	as	an	alternative	to	its	non-alignment).	One	of	the	reasons	
for	this	is	the	still	insufficient	degree	of	trust	between	the	two	countries	and	
the	insufficient	deterrence	value	of	such	an	alliance.	However,	this	does	not	
rule	out	joint	defence	planning	in	the	future	without	assuming	formal	casus	
foederis.	Helsinki’s	choice	of	a	new	fighter	aircraft	will	greatly	influence	the	
scale	of	military	co-operation	between	Finland	and	Sweden	in	the	coming	dec-
ades.	Sweden	will	certainly	resort	to	the	argument	of	interoperability	and	the	
possibility	to	use	Swedish	air	bases	in	the	process	of	lobbying	so	that	Finland	
chooses	the	Swedish	aircraft	JAS	39	Gripen.	
2. co-operation with the uSA
The	Cold	War	balance	of	power	made	defence	co-operation	between	Finland	
and	the	USA	impossible.	The	situation	changed	immediately	after	the	collapse	
of	the	USSR,	when	Finland	decided	to	procure	62	US	F-18	fighter	aircraft	(1992).	
Thus	the	USA	became	a	strategic	partner	in	the	development	of	Finland’s	air	
force,	which	still	affects	the	co-operation	in	training	pilots,	exercises	and	the	
modernisation	of	aircraft.	Since	Finland	has	small	missile	stockpiles,	supplies	
from	the	USA	would	be	of	key	significance	for	the	Finnish	air	force	in	case	
of	conflict	(the	domestic	defence	industry	is	working	mainly	for	the	needs	
of	the	land	forces).	The	navy	and	the	land	forces	are	increasingly	interested	
in	co-operation	with	the	USA	(procurement	of	naval	weapons	and	modernisa-
tion	of	the	artillery).	
Although	the	USA	has	supplied	around	half	of	Finland’s	armament	and	mili-
tary	equipment	purchased	abroad	since	1990,	this	has	not	translated	into	more	
extensive	defence	co-operation52.	On	the	one	hand	the	reasons	for	this	included	
the	lack	of	Finland’s	NATO	membership	and	the	US	focus	on	military	engage-
ment	outside	Europe	(mainly	the	Middle	East).	On	the	other	hand,	enhancing	
defence	co-operation	with	the	USA	has	met	with	political	resistance,	especially	
51	 Even	though	a	vision	of	such	an	alliance	has	been	pushed	through	by	some	Finnish	politi-
cians	and	is	supported	by	nearly	half	of	citizens.	Poll shows support for military union with 
Sweden,	 YLE,	 23	March	 2014,	 http://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/poll_shows_support_for_
military_union_with_sweden/7151598
52	 Collective	work,	NATO’s Northeastern Flank – Emerging Opportunities for Engagement,	RAND	
Corporation,	2017,	https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1467.html,	p.	209.
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from	the	Finnish	centre-left;	the	reasons	for	that	being	anti-American	senti-
ment	and	an	unwillingness	to	inflame	relations	with	Russia53.	
Over	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 these	 limitations	 have	 gradually	 been	 overcome	
as	a	result	of	the	development	of	Russia’s	military	capabilities.	The	strengthen-
ing	of	the	US	military	presence	in	the	Baltic	states	and	Poland	since	2014	has	
reinforced	the	perception	of	the	USA	in	Finland	as	a	guarantor	of	the	status 
quo	in	the	Nordic-Baltic	region.	In	turn,	Finland’s	significance	for	the	USA	has	
grown,	given	the	possibility	of	monitoring	Russian	military	activity	in	the	Far	
North	and	guaranteeing	the	security	of	the	Baltic	states54.	Finland	wants	to	use	
the	increased	US	military	presence	in	the	region	to	intensify	co-operation	with	
the	USA	in	the	area	of	bi-	and	multilateral	exercises,	and	therefore	to	improve	
interoperability	–	mainly	of	both	countries’	air	forces	and,	since	recently,	also	
of	the	land	forces.	Arrow	2016	was	the	first	ever	military	exercise	on	Finnish	
soil	which	engaged	a	US	mechanised	infantry	company.	Finland	has	also	invited	
the	USA	to	take	part	in	a	large	national	defence	exercise	planned	to	be	held	
in	2021	that	will	be	modelled	on	the	Swedish	Aurora	2017	exercise55.	The	Finn-
ish	engagement	in	US	military	exercises	in	the	region	(Saber	Strike,	BALTOPS)	
has	also	 increased.	 In	2016,	 the	 two	countries	 signed	a	 statement	of	 intent	
to	enhance	defence	co-operation56.	All	this	is	aimed	at	demonstrating	to	Russia	
that	the	non-aligned	Finland	is	part	of	the	West	and	in	fact	a	northern	exten-
sion	of	NATO’s	eastern	flank.	Military	co-operation	with	the	USA	is	supported	
by	59%	of	Finns	(35%	are	opposed	to	it)57.	
In	 the	 future,	Finnish-US	military	co-operation	will	 include	 increasingly	
advanced	military	exercises	and	further	US	engagement	in	the	modernisation	
of	Finland’s	armed	forces.	The	US	offers	Finland	the	sale	of	anti-missile	and	
anti-aircraft	(ESSM)	and	anti-ship	(Harpoon)	missiles	for	the	navy	and	coastal	
53	 Finland	does	not	participate	in	the	US	Foreign	Military	Financing	and	the	National	Guard’s	
State	Partnership	Program.	
54	 Finland	is	building	its	position	in	relations	with	the	USA	also	through	expeditionary	engage-
ment	(100	soldiers	in	Iraqi	Kurdistan	as	part	of	the	US-led	coalition	against	Islamic	State).
55	 The	participation	of	US	forces	in	such	exercises	will	mark	a	breakthrough	in	the	Finnish	
defence	policy.
56	 J.	Gotkowska	P.	Szymański,	Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer 
military co-operation with the United States,	“OSW	Commentary”,	1	April	2016,	https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-04-01/pro-american-non-alignment-
sweden-and-finland-develop-closer;	 P.	 Szymański,	 Bliższa współpraca obronna Finlandii 
i USA w cieniu Su-27,	 “OSW	Analyses”,	 12	October	 2016,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/pub-
likacje/analizy/2016-10-12/blizsza-wspolpraca-obronna-finlandii-i-usa-w-cieniu-su-27	
57	 Finns'  opinions…,	November	2017,	op. cit.
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artillery58	as	well	as	a	new	fighter	aircraft	for	the	air	 force	(F-35	or	Super	
Hornet).	
3. co-operation with nATo
Despite	the	gradual	opening	up	to	military	co-operation	with	the	West,	Finland	
has	not	made	efforts	to	join	NATO	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	The	factors	that	
decided	about	this	 included	both	fears	of	Moscow’s	reaction	and	of	Finland’s	
being	involved	in	a	conflict	between	Russia	and	the	West	as	well	as	the	convic-
tion	that	after	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	Europe	would	manage	to	build	a	new	
security	order.	Finland	also	wanted	to	keep	the	sense	of	continuity	in	its	for-
eign	and	security	policy	in	which	no	such	radical	turn	had	been	made	after	1991	
as	in	the	case	of	the	countries	from	the	former	Eastern	Bloc.	It	was	motivated	
by	the	fact	that	one	of	the	pillars	of	Finland’s	international	identity	is	the	legacy	
of	the	CSCE,	with	Finland	playing	the	role	of	a	broker	between	the	East	and	the	
West.	NATO	membership	is	currently	supported	by	2	out	of	9	parliamentary	
parties	and	22%	of	the	Finnish	public	(62%	are	opposed	to	it).	Interestingly,	the	
support	level	is	the	lowest	among	the	age	group	which	is	currently	becoming	
involved	in	politics	(25–34	years)59.	A	section	of	the	political	centre-right	who	
perceive	accession	to	NATO	as	an	investment	in	Finnish	security	emphasise	the	
significance	of	allied	guarantees	in	deterring	Russia.	Meanwhile,	the	centre-left,	
who	believe	that	accession	to	NATO	would	adversely	affect	the	Finland’s	level	
of	security,	traditionally	views	the	non-aligned	status	as	a	factor	that	contributes	
to	stability	in	the	region.	Low	public	support	for	membership	is	an	effect	of	many	
factors,	including:	the	legacy	of	the	Winter	War	(the	belief	that	Finland	is	capable	
of	independent	defence)	and	the	Cold	War	neutrality	policy,	the	unwillingness	
to	participate	in	distant	conflicts	and	the	perception	of	NATO	as	an	aggressive	
alliance,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	this	issue	remains	a	secondary	topic	in	political	
parties’	agendas	(and	therefore	in	electoral	campaigns	and	public	debate)60.	
Regardless	of	 the	divisions,	subsequent	governments	have	gradually	devel-
oped	ever	closer	co-operation	with	NATO,	without	applying	for	membership.	
58	 R.	Häggblom,	No Finnish Harpoon/ESSM-order (at least for now),	 “Corporal	 Frisk”,	 7	 February	
2018,	https://corporalfrisk.com/2018/02/07/no-finnish-harpoon-essm-order-at-least-for-now/	
59	 Finns'  opinions…,	November	2017,	op. cit.
60	 J.	Gotkowska,	P.	Szymański,	Between co-operation and membership. Sweden and Finland’s rela-
tions with NATO,	 “OSW	Studies”,	 February	 2017,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-studies/2017-03-03/between-co-operation-and-membership-sweden-and-finlands-
relations
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The	introduction	of	NATO	standards	in	the	Finnish	armed	forces	and	the	par-
ticipation	in	NATO	exercises	and	operations	(the	Balkans	and	Afghanistan)	
were	an	important	instrument	of	their	modernisation.	The	high	level	of	inter-
operability	with	NATO	forces	demonstrated	through	the	Finnish	participation	
in	NATO	Response	Force	(NRF)	since	2012	means	that	there	are	no	barriers	
in	military	terms	to	Finland’s	membership	in	the	alliance.	Helsinki	wants	Mos-
cow	to	view	it	as	a	reliable	alternative	to	Finland’s	non-alignment	and	thus	
prevent	Russia	from	pursuing	a	policy	that	would	pose	a	threat	to	Finland’s	
security	interests.	For	this	reason	Finland	does	not	officially	rule	out	applying	
for	membership	in	case	of	unfavorable	changes	in	its	security	environment.	
NATO’s	 stronger	 concentration	 on	 collective	 defence	 since	 the	 annexation	
of	Crimea	contributes	to	shifting	the	centre	of	gravity	of	Finland-NATO	rela-
tions	from	global	crisis	management	to	the	Baltic	Sea	region,	thus	creating	
new	perspectives	for	establishing	closer	co-operation.	One	example	is	the	Host	
Nation	Support	agreement	with	NATO	that	make	it	possible	for	NATO	to	use	
Finland’s	territory,	territorial	waters	and	airspace	at	peacetime,	in	crisis	situ-
ations	and	in	case	of	conflict	–	each	time	subject	to	the	Finnish	government’s	
consent	(this	agreement	has	been	in	force	since	2016).	Furthermore,	since	2014,	
Finland	has	belonged	to	a	group	of	five	privileged	partners	of	NATO	as	part	
of	the	Enhanced	Opportunities	Partnership,	which	offers	it	greater	opportuni-
ties	of	co-operation	as	regards	exercises,	military	operations	and	consultations	
on	security	in	the	Baltic	Sea	region61.	These	are	held	in	the	28+2	format	(NATO	
plus	Sweden	and	Finland).	
Finland	is	unlikely	to	take	action	to	join	NATO	during	the	next	parliamentary	
term	(2019–2023).	Objection	from	the	Social	Democrats	and	the	Centre	Party	
will	not	be	the	only	obstacle	–	even	the	pro-NATO	parties	(the	National	Coali-
tion	Party	and	the	Swedish	People’s	Party)	believe	that,	considering	the	cur-
rent	tensions	between	Russia	and	the	West,	the	application	for	membership	
needs	to	be	postponed.	However,	the	development	of	the	discussion	on	Finland’s	
NATO	membership	to	a	great	extent	depends	on	the	future	of	Sweden’s	security	
policy.	Sweden’s	application	for	NATO	membership	would	stoke	Finland’s	fears	
of	remaining	in	the	security	‘grey	zone’	between	NATO	and	Russia,	provide	
a	strong	argument	to	its	supporters	in	Finland,	and	weaken	the	objection	of	the	
centre-left	and	the	public.	It	is	in	Helsinki’s	interests	to	coordinate	the	issues	
of	possible	NATO	membership	with	Sweden	to	avoid	repeating	the	situation	
61	 Exchange	of	 information	with	NATO	in	order	to	build	 joint	situational	awareness	 is	also	
very	important	for	Finland.	
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from	the	1990s,	when	Sweden’s	application	for	accession	to	the	European	Com-
munity	came	as	a	surprise	to	Finland.	The	further	reinforcement	of	the	allied	
deterrence	in	the	Nordic-Baltic	region	is	another	factor	that	may	cause	a	revi-
sion	of	the	approach	to	NATO	in	Finland,	as	this	places	increasing	emphasis	
on	the	difference	between	members	and	non-members.	
4. co-operation in the European union
Finland,	with	its	peripheral	location	and	non-aligned	status,	treats	enhanc-
ing	European	integration	as	an	investment	in	its	own	security.	For	this	reason	
it	actively	participates	in	discussions	on	the	future	of	the	Common	Security	and	
Defence	Policy	which,	in	its	opinion,	should	become	an	effective	instrument	
of	improving	member	states’	military	capabilities62.	Finland,	which	has	a	well-
developed	arms	industry,	sees	the	benefits	of	establishing	the	European	Defence	
Fund	(EDF).	Helsinki	actively	supported	the	initiation	of	Permanent	Structured	
Cooperation	(PESCO)	in	the	area	of	security	and	defence	and	became	engaged	
in	the	first	stage	in	three	projects	in	radio	communication,	the	mobility	of	forces	
(so-called	military	Schengen)	and	cyber	security63.	However,	Finland	tradition-
ally	opposes	transforming	the	EU	into	a	military	alliance.	This	is	an	effect	not	
only	of	Finland’s	non-alignment	and	unwillingness	to	provide	security	guaran-
tees	to	the	Baltic	states	but	also	of	the	differences	in	the	defence	policies	of	the	
member	states,	including	the	understanding	of	the	mutual	assistance	clause	
(article	42.7	of	the	Treaty	of	the	European	Union).	
62	 J.	Sipilä,	Developing the EU’s defence dimension is in Finland’s interest,	Government	of	Finland,	
7	 June	 2017,	 http://vnk.fi/en/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/paaministeri-juha-sipila-eu-n-
puolustusulottuvuuden-kehittaminen-on-suomen-etu	
63	 The	European	Secure	Software	defined	Radio,	the	Military	Mobility	and	the	Cyber	Rapid	
Response	Teams	and	Mutual	Assistance	in	Cyber	Security.	Finland	also	has	observer	sta-
tus	 in	 the	 Cyber	Threats	 and	 Incident	 Response	 Information	 Sharing	 Platform.	 T.	Wie-
gold,	Vollzugsmeldung: PESCO, mehr Zusammenarbeit in der Verteidigung, in Kraft (Update),	
“Augengeradeaus”,	11	December	2017,	http://augengeradeaus.net/2017/12/vollzugsmeldung-
pesco-mehr-zusammenarbeit-in-der-verteidigung-in-kraft/	
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Iv. FInlAnd’S ArmEd ForcES:  
A modEl dETErrEncE or A pApEr TIgEr? 
From	Finland’s	viewpoint,	Russia’s	wars	with	Georgia	and	Ukraine	have	proven	
that	it	is	right	to	stick	to	the	principle	of	total	defence	and	a	conscript	army	con-
centrated	on	national	defence	tasks64.	At	the	same	time,	the	Russian	annexation	
of	Crimea	sparked	a	discussion	on	the	weaknesses	of	the	Finnish	defence	model	
resulting	from	financial	and	materiel	shortages	and	the	time	needed	to	mobilise	
reservists.	As	a	result,	Finland	began	investing	in	improving	the	level	of	the	
army’s	combat	readiness	and	is	increasing	the	wartime	strength	of	its	armed	
forces	for	the	first	time	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	The	Finnish	armed	forces	
are	composed	of	reserve	units	and	are	focused	on	training	conscripts,	which	
makes	it	difficult	to	assess	their	real	defence	capabilities.	
1. The conscript army and the defensive doctrine
Since	 1991,	Finland	has	maintained	 the	 foundations	of	 its	defence	doctrine	
formed	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	–	general	conscription,	a	large	trained	reserve,	
territorial	defence	principle,	and	a	total	defence	system.	The	arguments	for	
maintaining	this	doctrine	included:	the	continuing	sense	of	threat	from	Rus-
sia,	the	socio-political	support	for	conscription	and	the	economic	crisis	in	the	
1990s	which	discouraged	 the	government	 from	a	costly	professionalisation	
of	the	armed	forces.	This	makes	Finland	distinct	from	most	countries	in	the	
region	which,	since	the	late	1990s,	have	invested	in	expeditionary	capabilities	
for	the	needs	of	NATO	crisis	management	operations.	
Finland	still	believes	that	a	conscript	army	is	cheaper	and	more	effective.	
One	of	the	arguments	for	the	extensive	engagement	of	its	small	population	
(5.5	million)	in	the	country’s	defence	is	the	need	to	defend	its	large	territory	
(338	km2)65	and	long	border	with	Russia.	Compulsory	military	service	is	also	
an	important	part	of	civil	education	–	around	70%	of	annual	cohort	of	male	
citizens	 is	drafted	 (during	 the	Cold	War	period	 this	 ratio	 reached	around	
95%).	The	ageing	of	society	will	be	a	challenge	for	the	Finnish	armed	forces	
in	the	future.	The	smaller	number	of	conscripts	may	provoke	a	discussion	
64	 Total	defence	means	the	participation	of	all	state	structures	and	society	in	wartime	efforts.	
Comprehensive	 security	 is	 building	 the	 country’s	 resilience	 to	 all	 kinds	 of	military	 and	
non-military	threats	through	civilian	and	military	co-operation	at	peacetime.	
65	 Finland	has	the	lowest	population	density	among	the	EU	member	states.
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on	a	greater	opening	up	of	the	Finnish	armed	forces	to	women’s	military	ser-
vice.	81%	of	citizens	supported	conscription	in	201766.	
Finland	assumes	that	as	a	country	situated	in	the	periphery	of	its	civilisational	
base	(the	West)	and	bordering	on	a	potentially	hostile	power,	it	must	constantly	
demonstrate	its	will	and	readiness	to	defend	its	sovereignty.	It	does	so	mainly	
through	conscription	(over	20,000	conscripts	trained	annually)	and	refresher	
training	for	reservists	(around	18,000	annually).	At	the	same	time,	Finland	
profiles	its	military	posture	and	defence	investments	in	a	way	that	will	not	
be	interpreted	by	Russia	as	developing	offensive	capabilities.	From	Finland’s	
viewpoint,	the	main	deterring	factor	should	above	all	be	its	capability	to	mobi-
lise	a	substantial	reserve	force	(in	2017,	the	wartime	strength	of	Finnish	armed	
forces	reached	230,000	soldiers,	i.e.	over	4%	of	population),	which	raises	the	
costs	of	any	possible	aggression.	Therefore,	Finland’s	armed	forces	at	peacetime	
is	a	training	structure	with	a	small	number	of	professional	soldiers	(8,000)	
focused	on	work	with	conscripts.	However,	this	is	also	the	cause	of	the	great-
est	weakness	of	the	Finnish	land	forces:	the	low	level	of	units’	combat	readi-
ness67.	Mobilisation	of	the	reserve	is	time-consuming,	while	Russia	has	tactical	
military	formations	along	the	border	that	can	launch	offensive	actions	at	short	
notice68.	Finland’s	air	force	and	navy	are	more	professionalised	than	its	land	
forces,	and	as	such	have	a	higher	level	of	combat	readiness.	
The	 insufficient	defence	budget	 also	has	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 condition	of	 the	
Finnish	armed	forces.	In	Finland,	other	priorities,	for	example,	welfare	state	
expenses,	often	prevail	over	the	needs	of	the	army.	For	this	reason	the	Finnish	
plans	to	increase	defence	budget	need	to	be	viewed	with	caution69.	The	long-
standing	stagnation	in	defence	expenditure	at	a	level	around	1.5%	of	GDP	has	
resulted	in	shortages	in	weapons	and	military	equipment,	including	for	the	
needs	of	wartime	forces.	For	example,	the	number	of	navy	vessels	has	decreased	
66	 Finns'  opinions…,	November	2017,	op. cit.
67	 The	 special	 forces	 are	 the	 only	 part	 of	 the	 Finnish	 land	 forces	 prepared	 for	 immediate	
response.	S.	Forss,	L.	Kiianlinna,	P.	 Inkinen,	H.	Hult,	The Development of Russian Military 
Policy and Finland,	National	Defence	University	of	Finland,	2013,	p.	56.
68	 This	concerns	the	mechanised	brigades:	138th	in	Kamenka	(Leningrad	Oblast),	80th	in	Alakurtti	
(Murmansk	Oblast)	and	200th	in	Pechenga	(Murmansk	Oblast).	
69	 One	 of	 the	 government’s	 priorities	 after	 the	 election	 in	 2015	 was	 to	 gradually	 increase	
defence	expenditure	that	was	excluded	from	the	austerity	programme.	Meanwhile,	in	2016-
2018	military	expenditure	were	raised	by	only	2.5%	(from	2.8	to	2.87	billion	euros).
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over	the	past	few	years,	and	the	parliamentary	report	prepared	in	2014	pointed	
to	shortages	of	anti-tank	and	air	defence	systems70.	
The	land	forces	which	have	significant	artillery	and	armoured	potential	are	the	
most	important	branch	of	the	Finnish	armed	forces.	At	peacetime	they	con-
sist	of	five	brigades	(including	the	Arctic	and	the	armoured	brigade)	and	two	
regiments	(the	special	forces	and	one	tasked	with	urban	warfare,	especially	the	
defence	of	the	Helsinki	area).	At	wartime	the	manoeuvrable	component	(around	
35,000	soldiers)	is	to	be	the	main	strike	force	of	the	land	troops.	The	territorially	
organised	regional	component	(around	125,000	soldiers)	is	tasked	with	slowing	
down	the	enemy	(see	Appendix	2).	The	navy	is	in	charge	of	protecting	the	sea	
lines	of	communication	and	denying	access	to	the	Finnish	coastline	(the	great	
significance	of	minelaying)71.	Ensuring	air	superiority	used	to	be	the	main	role	
of	the	air	force.	However,	since	the	second	mid-life	upgrade	of	the	F/A-18	Hornet	
fighter	fleet	(gaining	air-to-surface	capabilities	by	equipping	it	with	JASSM	
missiles	and	JDAM	and	JSOW	precision	bombs),	which	was	completed	in	2016,	
their	tasks	have	been	expanded	to	include	air	support72.	For	a	country	with	
a	population	of	5.5	million,	Finland	has	strong	fighter	fleet	–	62	modernised	
F/A-18	Hornets.
2. Adjustment to the new challenges
Even	though	the	key	elements	of	the	defence	doctrine	have	been	preserved,	the	
Finnish	armed	forces	are	being	reformed	under	the	influence	of	new	trends	
in	military	technology	and	in	the	security	environment.	Investments	in	offen-
sive	capabilities	are	the	most	important	change.	Increasing	the	level	of	combat	
readiness	along	with	a	greater	readiness	to	recieve	and	provide	military	aid	
also	carry	great	weight.	
70	 Long-term challenges of defence: final report of the parliamentary assessment group,	Parliament	
of	 Finland,	May	 2014,	 https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoaeduskunnasta/julkaisut/Docu-
ments/ekj_5+2014.pdf
71	 Baltic	Sea	transport	is	of	key	significance	for	Finland,	since	around	90%	of	its	exports	and	
80%	of	 its	 imports	are	 transported	by	sea.	H.	Haapavaara,	Merivoimille neljä 105-metristä 
korvettia – 1,2 miljardilla suurimmat alukset sitten panssarilaiva Ilmarisen ja Väinämöisen,	
“Tekniikka	&	Talous”,	17	January	2018,	https://www.tekniikkatalous.fi/tekniikka/metalli/
merivoimille-nelja-105-metrista-korvettia-1-2-miljardilla-suurimmat-alukset-sitten-
panssarilaiva-ilmarisen-ja-vainamoisen-6696642	
72	 All Finnish Air Force’s Hornets Upgraded to MLU 2,	Finnish	Defence	Forces,	16	December	2016,	
http://ilmavoimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/kaikki-ilmavoimien-hornetit-on-nyt-
paivitetty-mlu-2-tasoon	
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(1) Quantity versus quality.	Since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	Finland	has	con-
ducted	a	number	of	reforms	of	its	armed	forces	guided	by	the	principle	of	replac-
ing	 the	 quantitative	 approach	with	 investments	 in	 improving	 the	 quality	
of	the	training	of	soldiers,	and	of	military	equipment	(see	Appendix	3).	This	
entailed	gradual	reductions	in	the	number	of	professional	military	personnel	
and	in	the	size	of	wartime	forces,	which	were	correlated	with	the	shrinking	
of	the	Russian	army	after	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	Since	the	1990s,	Finland	
has	reduced	its	wartime	forces	by	more	than	a	half	—	from	530,000	to	230,000	
soldiers.	Another	cause	behind	this	was	the	search	for	budgetary	savings,	which	
was	essential	during	the	most	thorough	reform	conducted	in	2013–2014	after	
the	financial	 crisis.	The	wartime	strength	was	reduced	 then	 from	358,000	
to	230,000	soldiers,	which	most	of	all	affected	the	land	forces	(cut	from	265,000	
to	160,000).	There	have	also	been	reductions	in	professional	military	personnel	
(from	15,000	to	12,300,	including	civilians),	the	scale	of	refresher	exercises	for	
the	reserve	(from	25,000	to	18,000	reservists	annually)	and	the	general	number	
of	structures	in	the	armed	forces	(from	51	to	32)	by	merging	units,	centralising	
logistics,	and	eliminating	one	level	of	command	(i.e.	four	regional	commands	
whose	competences	have	been	taken	over	by	brigades),	among	other	measures73.
An	analogous	trend	has	also	been	seen	 in	military	equipment.	Finland	has	
been	gradually	withdrawing	or	modernising	its	Cold	War	era	weapons	(mainly	
post-Soviet),	focusing	on	the	acquisition	of	smaller	quantities	of	more	techno-
logically	advanced	systems.	Given	its	budget	limitation,	Finland	prefers	buying	
second-hand	armament	from	its	partners	(e.g.	Leopard	tanks	from	Germany	and	
the	Netherlands,	MLRS	multiple	rocket	launchers	from	the	Netherlands	and	K9	
self-propelled	howitzers	from	South	Korea).	A	less	frequent	choice	is	to	acquire	
new	armament,	 as	was	 the	 case	when	Finland	replaced	 the	Soviet	Buk	air	
defence	systems	with	the	Norwegian-US	NASAMS	2.	In	general,	the	Finnish	
army	has	a	 limited	quantity	of	modern	materiel	 (mainly	 for	manoeuvrable	
forces)	and	a	still	large	Cold	War	era	arsenal	(mainly	for	regional	forces).	Fin-
land	is	to	allocate	an	additional	150	million	euros	annually	to	the	new	procure-
ments	from	2021.	In	the	coming	decade,	Helsinki	is	planning	to	acquire	new	
multi-role	vessels	(at	an	estimated	cost	of	1.2	billion	euros)	and	fighter	aircraft	
(at	an	estimated	cost	of	7–10	billion	euros).	By	these	ambitious	modernisation	
programmes	Finland’s	defence	budget	 is	 intended	 to	rise	 to	 the	 level	of	2%	
73	 Kokonaisarvio puolustusvoimauudistuksesta valmistunut,	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 of	 Finland,	
31	 October	 2016,	 http://www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/kokonaisarvio_puolus-
tusvoimauudistuksesta_valmistunut.8043.news;	P.	Felstead,	Northern composure, “Jane’s”,	
2017,	http://www.janes.com/images/assets/660/69660/Northern_composure.pdf
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of	GDP	starting	from	2022	(increasing	the	public	debt).	During	the	implemen-
tation	of	both	programmes	Finland	will	most	likely	try	to	balance	procurements	
from	Sweden	and	USA.	Given	the	huge	(for	Finland)	costs	of	the	new	vessels	and	
fighters	Finland’s	armament	plans	may	face	some	delays.	
The	Russian-Ukrainian	war	provoked	a	discussion	 in	Finland	as	 to	whether	
the	army	reform	completed	in	2014	had	been	reasonable.	As	a	result,	 in	June	
2017,	Finland	adopted	a	new	strategic	planning	document	(the	Government’s	
Defence	Report)	under	which	its	armed	forces’	wartime	strength	was	increased	
to	280,000	soldiers,	which	is	set	to	strengthen	mainly	the	regional	forces74.	How-
ever,	the	significance	of	this	correction	of	the	reform	should	not	be	overstated,	
since	it	will	be	achieved	partly	by	including	conscripts	and	border	guards,	who	
have	previously	not	been	counted,	into	the	wartime	forces.	Nor	does	this	solve	the	
problem	of	the	insufficient	number	of	professional	soldiers	(around	600	positions	
remained	unmanned	in	the	Finnish	armed	forces	due	to	budget	cuts).	Besides	this,	
it	raises	the	question	whether	army	is	capable	of	providing	mobilised	reservists	
with	sufficient	quantity	of	weapons	and	military	equipment.	It	is	possible	that	
technological	progress	and	the	additional	burden	linked	to	training	conscripts	
will	force	Finland	to	increase	the	number	of	professional	soldiers.	
(2) Conventional versus hybrid conflict. The	Finnish	armed	forces	are	focused	
on	developing	its	capabilities	of	repelling	a	conventional	attack.	However,	the	
conclusions	made	after	 the	Russian	Crimean	operation	have	made	Finland	
attach	greater	 importance	 to	counteracting	hybrid	 threats.	As	part	of	 this,	
it	has	strengthened	the	border	guard	(in	terms	of	personnel,	equipment	and	
new	powers),	updated	the	military	exercises	scenarios	and	introduced	a	number	
of	legal	amendments	enabling	a	more	rapid	response	to	the	emergence	of	sub-
versive	paramilitary	groups	and	the	expropriation	of	real	estate	located	close	
to	military	objects	when	there	is	a	suspicion	that	these	can	be	used	against	the	
country’s	defence	potential.	The	European	Centre	of	Excellence	for	Countering	
Hybrid	Threats	established	in	2017	in	Helsinki	for	NATO	and	EU	member	states	
is	expected	to	be	an	important	tool	to	improve	resilience	to	hybrid	aggression.
(3) Combat readiness.	Although	the	need	to	increase	the	level	of	combat	readi-
ness	of	the	armed	forces	had	been	discussed	for	a	long	time,	it	has	only	been	
74	 Government’s Defence Report,	 Government	 of	 Finland,	 16	 February	 2017,	 https://www.
defmin.fi/files/3688/J07_2017_Governments_Defence_Report_Eng_PLM_160217.pdf	
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in	the	past	few	years	that	a	number	of	new	solutions	were	adopted	in	this	area75.	
These	include	updating	the	reservists’	database	(900,000	reservists),	increasing	
the	number	of	refresher	exercises	for	reserve	soldiers	(due	to	funding	short-
ages,	only	4,000-5,000	reservists	participated	in	them	annually	in	2012-2014;	
this	number	is	18,000	at	present)	and	adapting	additional	airfields	to	accom-
modate	standby	fighters	(Quick	Reaction	Alert).	Furthermore,	since	2016,	the	
president	has	had	the	right	to	call	up	as	many	as	25,000	reservists	for	snap	
drills	(without	the	three	months’	notice	that	had	hitherto	been	required).	This	
line	of	strengthening	defence	capabilities	is	also	included	in	the	Government’s	
Defence	Report	which	assigns	some	conscripts	to	the	rapid	manning	of	units	
in	the	event	of	a	crisis	or	conflict.	Their	military	service	has	been	extended	from	
6	to	12	months.	Since	2018,	Finland	will	allocate	an	additional	55	million	euros	
annually	on	improving	the	level	of	its	army’s	combat	readiness.	These	changes	
are	aimed	at	reducing	Russia’s	initial	strike	advantage	in	case	of	a	conflict	and	
improving	flexibility	in	responding	to	irregular	warfare.	
(4) Offensive capabilities and retaliation. The	purchase	of	70	US	JASSM	long-
range	cruise	missiles	(air-to-surface)	 in	2012,	which	are	already	integrated	
with	Finnish	Hornets,	was	a	deviation	from	the	principle	of	developing	strictly	
defensive	capabilities.	They	have	a	range	of	up	to	350	km,	which	means	that	
Finland	for	the	first	time	in	history	is	capable	of	destroying	targets	at	the	rear	
of	the	enemy’s	forces.	At	the	same	time,	Finland	upgraded	its	MLRS	multiple	
rocket	launchers,	gaining	the	capability	of	using	GMLRS	guided	ammunition	
which	have	a	range	of	up	to	70	km	and	ATACMS	ballistic	missiles	with	a	range	
of	up	to	165	km	(purchase	of	latter	was	postponed).	However,	these	have	been	
the	only	moves	made	by	Finland	so	far	that	can	be	recognised	as	building	its	
own	offensive	capabilities	(mainly	due	to	defence	buget	constraints)76.	
(5) International co-operation. The	Finnish	armed	forces,	which	until	recently	
stuck	 to	 the	principle	of	 independent	defence,	are	 increasingly	opening	up	
to	the	option	of	receiving	and	providing	military	assistance.	This	pertains	not	
only	to	the	agreement	with	NATO	(Host	Nation	Support),	but	also	to	legisla-
tion	changes	introduced	in	June	2017	that	allow	Finland	to	ask	another	state,	
the	EU	and	international	organisations	for	military	support.	At	the	same	time,	
75	 P.	Järvenpää,	Preparing for the worst: conscription and reserve forces in the Nordics,	ICDS,	Octo-
ber	 2016,	 https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2016/ICDS_Analysis_-_Preparing_for_the_
Worst_-_Pauli_Jarvenpaa.pdf
76	 In	the	case	of	the	navy,	the	purchase	of	Harpoon	missiles	(RGM-84Q-4	Harpoon	Block	II	
Plus	ER)	would	ensure	such	capabilities.
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Finland	will	be	able	to	send	its	soldiers	abroad	with	a	mandate	to	use	force	
in	order	to	aid	another	state77.	These	are	essential	changes	in	the	Finnish	defence	
policy	because	until	recently	the	law	permitted	engaging	the	armed	forces	only	
in	three	cases:	national	defence	tasks,	support	to	the	administration,	and	par-
ticipation	in	crisis	management	operations.	Work	on	amending	relevant	legis-
lation	began	in	2009	and	gained	momentum	after	France	activated	the	mutual	
assistance	clause	of	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	(article	42.7)	in	effect	of	the	terrorist	
attacks	in	2015.
77	 Decisions	to	this	effect	are	taken	by	the	president	in	co-operation	with	the	government	and	
after	consultations	with	parliament	(commission	for	foreign	affairs).
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Finland’s military expenditure in billions of US$ and as a per-
centage of GDP 
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
[%][US$ bn]
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Source:	SIPRI	Military	Expenditure	Database,	SIPRI,	https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
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Appendix 3. Finland’s wartime strength of armed forces in thousands 
of soldiers and as percentage of population
1975 1990 2000 2010 2015 2020
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Source:	P.	Visuri,	Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine, 1945-1985,	“Finnish	Defence	Studies”,	War	
College,	Helsinki	1990;	R.	Penttilä,	Finland’s search for security through defence, 1944-89,	London	1991;	
Population,	Statistics	Finland,	https://www.stat.fi/til/vrm_en.html;	The Military Balance,	IISS
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map. Finland’s	territorial	losses	in	World	War	II
FINLAND
RUSSIA
ESTONIA
Murmansk
Tallinn
Saint PetersburgStockholm
Helsinki
SWEDEN
SA
LL
A
KA
RE
LIA
Borders in 1939 
Bordes after 1944 
PE
TS
AM
O
/©
Source:	R.	Penttilä,	Finland’s search for security through defence, 1944-89,	London	1991
